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DEATH BY FIFTY CUTS: EXPORTING LUNN V.
COMMONWEALTH TO MAINE AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR WAGING A FRONTAL ASSAULT ON THE ICE
DETAINER SYSTEM IN STATE COURTS
Sean Turley*
Abstract
As long as the future of federal immigration policy remains unsettled and
the use of ICE detainers to capture and deport suspected noncitizens remains
widespread, practitioners should focus their attention on waging a frontal assault
against the legality of ICE detainers on state law grounds by arguing that they
constitute warrantless arrests that are prohibited by state statute. The recent
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in Lunn v. Commonwealth
provides a model for how to wage such an attack—not only in states with similar
common law and statutory frameworks that are unlikely to resolve the issue
legislatively, like Maine, but also in states with legislatures diametrically opposed
to placing any limitations on local law enforcement agencies’ abilities to effectuate
federal immigration policy, like Texas. The fact that the reasoning in Lunn can be
exported beyond Massachusetts’ borders suggests that state courts are likely to
serve as an important front in the fight against the legality of ICE detainers and to
provide a rare opportunity for practitioners opposed to the Trump administration’s
draconian immigration policies to disrupt one of its primary mechanisms for
arresting and deporting suspected noncitizens.
I. INTRODUCTION
President Trump’s promise to severely curtail illegal immigration1 and his
administration’s renewal of the controversial Secure Communities program2 has
*
J.D. candidate, University of Maine School of Law, class of 2019. The author is eternally grateful
to Sue Roche, Philip Mantis, Kate Chesney, and the rest of the staff at the Immigrant Legal Advocacy
Project for an invaluable experience working in immigrant law and for bringing these cases to the
author’s attention. The author also thanks Anna Welch, Richard Chen, and Jana Kenney for their
helpful feedback and support throughout the writing process.
1
See Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, New Trump Deportation Rules Allow Far More Expulsions,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2m4lcIO (“President Trump has directed his administration
to enforce the nation’s immigration laws more aggressively, unleashing the full force of the federal
government to find, arrest and deport those in the country illegally, regardless of whether they have
committed serious crimes.”).
2
The Obama administration launched the “Secure Communities” program in the summer of 2009
to facilitate the sharing of fingerprint information that local police already collected and provided to the
FBI with the Department of Homeland Security, which, in turn, furnished a mechanism by which ICE
could check arrestees’ immigration status and issue a detainer to hold the arrestee until ICE could take
custody. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 94 (2013).
Present Obama expanded the program during his first term but after facing increasing scrutiny, the
administration ultimately replaced it with the Priority Enforcement Program, which refocused ICE’s
attention on the arrest and deportation of noncitizens convicted of criminal offenses but kept the same
biometric data sharing system and the procedures for issuing detainers as its predecessor. See, e.g.,
Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1197, 1209–10 (2016); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
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brought the legality of Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) detainers3 to
the forefront of the national debate surrounding proper immigration enforcement.
It has become a hotly contested issue in several states,4 particularly in light of
recent federal court decisions that suggest that an ICE detainer is an
unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable seizures5 and the Trump administration’s increasing use of them as a
means to execute its draconian approach to preventing illegal immigration. 6 The
Sec.,
Secure
Communities
(Nov.
20,
2014),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WXQ2-ZHG2]. President Trump resurrected the Secure Communities program
through an Executive Order four days into his presidency. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8700
(Jan. 25, 2017) (“The Secretary shall immediately take all appropriate action to terminate the Priority
Enforcement Program . . . and to reinstitute the immigration program known as ‘Secure
Communities.’”).
3
ICE detainers serve as a “request” for a state or local law enforcement agency (LEA) to detain a
noncitizen “when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.” 8 C.F.R. §
287.7(a); see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396, 410 (2012); City of Santa Clara v. Trump,
250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Only ICE officers can issue detainers. Memorandum from
Acting ICE Director Thomas D. Homan, Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration
Officers (Mar. 24, 2017). This detention cannot exceed 48 hours in duration, excluding weekends and
holidays. § 287.7(d). Although § 287.7(d) includes the phrase “such agency shall maintain custody of
the alien” (emphasis added), compliance with a detainer is always voluntary. Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45
F. Supp. 3d 791, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“[E]very federal court of appeals that has considered the nature of
ICE detainers characterizes them as ‘requests’ that impose no mandatory obligation on the part of the
detainer’s recipient.”); see Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The words ‘shall
maintain custody,’ in the context of the regulations as a whole, appear next to the use of the world
‘request’ throughout the regulation[,] [meaning] it is hard to read the use of the word ‘shall’ in the
timing section to change the nature of the entry regulation.”). ICE issued over 400,000 detainers
annually in 2012 and 2013, which was double the number from a decade prior and twenty times as
frequently as in the 1980s. Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and the
New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 106 (2016).
4
Caitlin Dickerson, A Sheriff’s Bind: Cross the White House, or the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13,
2017), https://nyti.ms/2xZbCZs [https://perma.cc/6FLN-FTY8
] (“The political jockeying [between local LEAs and the federal government] is rooted in a vexing
constitutional disconnect between criminal justice and immigration enforcement . . . .”). Kim Geiger,
Rauner signs immigration, automatic voter registration bills into law, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 28,
2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-immigration-voting-met0829-20170828-story.html [https://perma.cc/29EW-DJQC] (discussing Illinois’s decision to adopt the
Trust Act, which forbids LEAs from honoring ICE detainers).
5
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens and noncitizens alike.
See generally Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S.
149 (1923); Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., Report No. R42690, Immigration Detainers: Legal
Issues, at 18 (2015) (“[Noncitizens] have been found to be entitled to the protections of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments because they are encompassed by the usage of the word ‘person’ in those
amendments.”). In the past several years, courts across the country have held that ICE detainers violate
noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures because the
federal power to regulate immigration is “subject to important constitutional limitations.” Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001); see City of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 510 (noting that “[s]everal
courts have held that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for local jurisdictions to hold suspected
or actual removable aliens subject to civil detainer requests . . . .”); Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d
1237, 1258–59 (E.D. Wash. 2017) (“Courts around the country have held that local law enforcement
officials violate the Fourth Amendment when they temporarily detain individuals for immigration
violations without probable cause.”).
6
After the issuance of detainers gradually decreased during the Obama administration from its
peak in 2011, the Trump administration immediately ramped up their use—leading to a 31.7 percent
jump between January and March of 2017. Use of ICE Detainers: Obama vs. Trump,
TRACIMMIGRATION,
(Aug.
30,
2017),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/479/
[https://perma.cc/4D2C-4ZMN].

238

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70.2

Trump administration has vociferously opposed any reluctance by local law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) or states to honor ICE detainers by threatening to
withhold federal funding to communities that do not abide by detainer requests, 7
even though such a move risks infringing on Tenth Amendment protections against
the commandeering of LEAs to do the federal government’s bidding. 8 Responses
by LEAs across the nation have been mixed. Some have decided to disregard ICE
detainers given their apparent unconstitutionality. 9 Others have tried to cooperate
with the Justice Department in order to blunt the impact of the adverse federal court
decisions by claiming that ICE immediately takes custody of the noncitizens who
are arrested because they are placed in a cell rented by federal immigration
authorities.10 State legislatures have also entered the fray, with some passing bills
to compel local police officials to honor ICE detainers by penalizing departments
that disregard them11 and others enacting legislation that explicitly prevent LEAs
from abiding by detainer requests.12
While most of the discussion at the national level about detainers has
focused on the practice’s constitutionality, 13 less attention has been paid to the
intersection of ICE detainers with state law. The recent decision by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Lunn v. Commonwealth14 provides a
model for how opponents of federal immigration policy can use state courts to
undercut one of ICE’s primary means of executing its crackdown and to provide
7
Julie H. Davis & Charlie Savage, White House to States: Shield the Undocumented and Lose
Police Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ob7TUw; Vivian Yee, Judge Blocks
Trump Effort to Withhold Money from Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2piGzqA [https://perma.cc/3NWG-Y3MC]. The threat to withhold funding relates to
non-detainer spending, as the federal government does not reimburse LEAs for honoring detainers. City
of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 511.
8
If federal authorities were to mandate that state and local LEAs needed to act as agents of the
federal government by requiring them to abide by ICE detainers, then that policy may violate the Tenth
Amendment’s protections against the “commandeering” of local officials to implement federal law.
Galarza, 745 F.3d at 643 (“[T]he federal government cannot command the government agencies of the
states to imprison persons of interest to federal officials.”); see generally Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 922 (“The power of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were
able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police officers of the 50 states.”).
9
Dickerson, supra, note 4 (“At least four state legislatures and many more cities and counties have
considered enacting . . . laws [that restrict extended jail holds or ban them altogether] this year.”).
10
Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Administration Moves to Expand Deportation Dragnet to Jails, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2vQTOBC [https://perma.cc/WZ8Z-V7FU] (“The Trump
administration is working with like-minded sheriffs from around the country on a plan to channel
undocumented immigrants from local jails into federal detention . . . [with] [t]he legal argument [being]
that the arrangement effectively makes the immigrant a detainee of ICE, not the sheriff’s
department . . . .”).
11
James Barragán, Appeals Court Rules Parts of Texas’ Sanctuary Cities Ban Can Go Into Effect,
MORNING
NEWS
(Sept.
25,
2017),
DALL.
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2017/09/25/appeals-court-rules-parts-texas-sanctuary-citiesban-can-go-effect [https://perma.cc/GKB8-L4VQ] (discussing a recent Fifth Circuit opinion ruling that
Texas could implement part of a bill passed in 2017 that prohibited states from disobeying ICE detainers
or failing to cooperate with federal immigration officials).
12
Kim Geiger, Rauner Signs Immigration, Automatic Voter Registration Bills Into Law, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-bruce-raunerimmigration-voting-met-0829-20170828-story.html [https://perma.cc/DU9P-7XVQ] (discussing the
passage of a bill forbidding Illinois police departments from honoring ICE detainers).
13
Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. 125,
128 (2015) (noting that these cases have provided a new means to “attack immigration enforcement on
the front end.”).
14
78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017).
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legal support for the increasing number of local sheriffs and communities who have
refused to honor detainers.
In Lunn, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that
Massachusetts’s LEAs act without sufficient legal justification when they comply
with ICE detainers by holding suspected noncitizens beyond the period of
incarceration imposed for the original charge that landed them in custody.15
According to the court, when LEAs comply with ICE detainers and maintain
custody of noncitizens, they have, in effect, “arrested” those noncitizens for civil
violations of immigration law (i.e., unlawful presence) without a warrant, and by
maintaining custody of them without sufficient cause for such an arrest, the police
departments violate Massachusetts law. 16
Lunn ultimately matters because it shows that state court rulings may bar
LEAs from honoring ICE detainers, as doing so would clearly violate state laws
that limit their authority to execute warrantless arrests for civil violations of federal
law.17 The fact that the logic behind this holding can be exported to other states
transforms a case that may at first appear to be a limited regional victory into a
national battle cry for practitioners to launch a frontal assault against the ICE
detainer system through state courts.18
This Note will illustrate that Lunn’s summary and application of the
relevant federal and state law provides a model strategy for attacking ICE detainers
in other states with slightly different common law precedents and statutory
language by applying it to Maine. Maine provides an interesting case study for a
couple of reasons. For one, the divided nature of its government,19 the divisiveness
of Maine’s political process,20 and Governor Paul LePage’s ardent opposition to
illegal immigration21 make it quite unlikely that the state will pass a law that
15

Id. at 1146.
Id. Although the civil nature of unlawful presence is not disputed, see Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012), it is still possible—if not probable—that LEAs may not understand this fact.
Because civil immigration detainer notices are reported in the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) system—which is primarily used to “notify law enforcement of strictly criminal warrants and/or
criminal matters”—it is likely that LEAs are unaware that presence without legal status is a noncriminal matter. Major City Chiefs Immigration Committee, M.C.C. Immigration Committee
Recommendations (June, 2006), available at http://www.houstontx.gov/police/pdfs/mcc_position.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PLJ-T5UJ] (warning that the use of the NCIC system to distribute detainers “has
created confusion . . . and in fact lays a trap for unwary officers who believe them to be valid criminal
warrants or detainers.”).
17
Lunn, 78 N.E.3d at 1146.
18
The concept of attacking the legality of ICE detainers at all—even as a violation of federal
law—is a relatively novel approach because for years little precedent supported such a strategy. See
Kagan, supra note 13, at 128 (“The new wave of federal cases are different because they find
constitutional weakness with the way in which immigrants are taken into custody, not just with how
long they are detained. They attack immigration enforcement on the front end.”). Fighting against ICE
detainers at the state level, then, offers a new method of attack in a conflict that has been primarily
dominated by a debate about constitutional rights.
19
Scott Thistle, Republicans Hold Majority in Maine Senate, Draw Nearly Even with Democrats
PRESS
HERALD
(Nov.
10,
2016),
in
House,
PORTLAND
http://www.pressherald.com/2016/11/10/republicans-hold-majority-in-maine-senate-draw-nearly-evenwith-democrats-in-house/ [https://perma.cc/4FTC-U8ZJ].
20
See, e.g., Scot Lehigh, In Maine, It’s LePage Against the Legislature, BOS. GLOBE (July 9,
2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/07/09/maine-paul-lepage-againstlegislature/Bv6xSVAMoHSIHHLbsFULPO/story.html https://perma.cc/ZL8M-BZVV].
21
LePage has a history of expressing his vehement opposition to illegal immigration by claiming—
without evidence—that “illegals” hurt Maine by spreading disease and draining funds from the state's
welfare program. See, e.g., Joe Lawlor, State Won’t Name Restaurant Where Worker Had Hepatitis A,
16

240

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70.2

clarifies the legality of LEAs honoring detainers under state law.
Secondly, the common criminal law foundation in Maine is relatively
similar but not identical to that of Massachusetts, making the comparison and
application of Lunn apt. The issue is especially pertinent in Maine after the debate
over honoring detainers recently flared up when the Cumberland County Sheriff,
Kevin Joyce, decided to follow in the footsteps of several of his fellow sheriffs
across the country22 by refusing to honor ICE detainers without an accompanying
judicial warrant because fulfilling them “could violate the individual’s Fourth
Amendment right and we could ultimately be sued for false imprisonment.”23
Although Sheriff Joyce’s fear is well-founded,24 Governor LePage quickly
denounced Joyce’s decision and promised to remove from office any sheriff who
do not work with ICE because he believes that their refusal to cooperate violates
Maine law.25 LePage’s insistence makes the holding and logic of Lunn particularly
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/10/31/maine-cdcrestaurant-worker-may-have-exposed-patrons-to-hepatitis-a [https://perma.cc/TEY6-WV5W] (reporting
on LePage’s statement that he had “been trying to get [President Obama] to pay attention to the illegals
in our country because there’s been a spike in hepatitis C, tuberculosis and HIV, but it’s going on deaf
ears”); see also Amanda Hoover, Maine Governor Says He Is Suing “Illegal Immigrant,” Not the
President, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2015/08/12/mainegovernor-says-he-is-suing-illegal-immigrants-not-the-president [https://perma.cc/4SJT-K86K] (noting
that LePage denied that his personal lawsuit in opposition to Obama’s 2014 executive order shielding
some noncitizens from deportation was filed against the President, but instead against “illegal
immigrants taking state money against state and federal laws”).
22
See, e.g., Noelle Phillips, Colorado Sheriffs Say They Will Not Be Shamed by New ICE Naughty
List, DENVER POST (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/03/22/colorado-sheriffs-wont-beshamed-ice-naughty-list [https://perma.cc/8E9R-4M5M] (discussing resistance amongst Colorado
sheriffs to honoring ICE detainers); Joel Rubin & Paloma Esquivel, For Some California Sheriffs, It’s
Not Politics Stopping Them from Fully Helping ICE: It’s The Legal Risk, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ice-detainers-sheriffs-20170330-story.html
[https://perma.cc/N3DN-9E8H] (noting that none of California’s Fifty-eight county sheriffs honor ICE
detainers).
23
Jake Bleiberg, Maine Sheriff Won’t Detain Inmates Any Longer for Immigration Agents,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://bangordailynews.com/2017/09/20/politics/maine-sheriffsays-he-wont-detain-inmates-longer-for-immigration-agents [https://perma.cc/2SFA-MQMB]; see also
Matt Byrne, Cumberland County Jail Stops Holding Some Inmates for Immigration Agents, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.pressherald.com/2017/09/20/sheriff-joyce-stops-holdingsome-inmates-at-request-of-immigration-agents [https://perma.cc/9K9P-EHZL].
24
Recent ICE Detainer Cases, ACLU IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT (July 25, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/other/recent-ice-detainer-cases (listing eight cases resulting in significant
monetary settlements or damages against local police for honoring ICE detainers); Galarza v. Szalczyk,
745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[The LEA] was free to disregard the ICE detainer, and it therefore
cannot use a defense that its own policy did not cause the deprivation of [the noncitizen’s] constitutional
rights.”).
25
Edward D. Murray, LePage Says He’ll Remove Sheriffs Who Refuse To Hold Certain Inmates
PRESS
HERALD
(Sept.
25,
2017),
for
Immigration
Agents,
PORTLAND
http://www.pressherald.com/2017/09/25/lepage-says-he-will-remove-maine-sheriff-for-refusing-tohold-prisoners-for-immigration-agents [https://perma.cc/QH44-33DJ] (“We have a couple sheriffs who
say they’re not going to be working with ICE . . . [and] unbeknownst to them, the Maine Constitution
says if they don’t follow state law, that I can remove them.”). Maine’s constitution states that
“[w]henever the Governor . . . shall find that a sheriff is not faithfully or efficiently performing any duty
imposed upon the sheriff by law, the Governor may remove such sheriff from office and appoint another
sheriff to serve for the remainder of the term for which such removed sheriff was elected.” ME. CONST.
art. IX, § 10. LePage has since publicly deferred to Maine state courts regarding the matter but has not
yet changed his stance that he will fire the sheriffs for not honoring ICE detainers. Fred Bever,
Governor Says He’ll “Let Courts Decide” If Holding Released Inmates for ICE Violates Civil Rights,
ME. PUBLIC (Sept. 28, 2017), http://mainepublic.org/post/governor-says-hell-let-courts-decide-ifholding-released-inmates-ice-violates-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/Z9U6-8WQU].

2018]

DEATH BY FIFTY CUTS

241

important to how this conflict will be resolved in Maine. If, contrary to LePage’s
assertion, ICE detainers violate state law, then LePage will not be able to fire the
sheriffs; but if state courts find that ICE detainers accord with common law,
LePage will be able to use the threat of firing sheriffs to chill any resistance.
Because this stand-off between county sheriffs and the governor in Maine is
emblematic of conflicts within states across the country regarding the proper
response to changing federal immigration priorities in general and the increasing
number of cases challenging the constitutionality of ICE detainers in particular,
analyzing the legality of these detainers through the state law lens provides a
critical insight into how the battle over the legality of ICE detainers can be waged
at the local level, regardless of how federal courts eventually decide the issue.26
The purpose of this Note, then, is to illustrate how Lunn provides a new
front on which opponents of current federal immigration policies can attack the
legality of ICE detainers in order to either significantly curtail or outright end the
practice. It may be easy to imagine after just a cursory review of the Lunn case that
the court’s holding is simply a result of the peculiarities of Massachusetts common
law or a byproduct of the state’s liberal bent.27 But that is not an accurate reading.
Instead, this Note will demonstrate that the revolutionary logic in Lunn is easily
exportable to other states because it is founded in generally accepted common law
principles, thereby extending its ramifications far beyond the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. Put simply, the holding in Lunn suggests that now is the
appropriate time for opponents of ICE detainers to use state courts to fight against
the ICE detainer system.
Part II of this Note will introduce this argument by walking through an
exegesis of Lunn to show how the case is revolutionary for being the first of its
kind to synthesize the relevant federal case law and apply it within a state law
context, and for how it establishes a model for practitioners to follow in order to
attack ICE detainers in other states’ courts. Part III will demonstrate the general
exportability of Lunn to states with similar common law frameworks by
demonstrating that ICE detainers most likely violate Maine state law because (a)
holding noncitizens in accordance with an ICE detainer qualifies as an “arrest”; (b)
no Maine statute or common law precedent justify an arrest for civil violations of
26
It is conceivable that Republicans in Congress and the White House will attempt to undercut
“sanctuary city” policies through legislation, especially after a federal judge blocked the Justice
Department’s attempt to unilaterally deny funding to these communities. See generally Eli Rosenberg,
Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s Executive Order on Denying Funding to Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST
(Nov.
21,
2017),
http://wapo.st/2zXBxmt?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.e3489bfae20c
[https://perma.cc/74M5-JMGS] (reviewing U.S. District Judge William H. Orrick’s final decision to
permanently block Executive Order 13768, which revoked financial support to so-called “sanctuary
cities”). The House has already passed Kate’s Law, which attempts to criminalize reentry by a
noncitizen who has been deported or denied admission, or who has departed the United States, and the
No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, which punishes states and localities that do not comply with the
carrying out of federal immigration policy—including ICE detainer requests—by denying them a
variety of grants and other monetary assistance. Kate’s Law, H.R. 3004, 115th Cong. (2017); No
Sanctuary for Criminals Act, H.R. 3003, 115 Cong. (2017). The fact that state common law precedent is
likely to change much more slowly means that it provides a relatively more stable foundation on which
to launch an attack against ICE detainers.
27
See Jim O’Sullivan, Massachusetts: Even More Liberal Than You Thought, BOS. GLOBE (July
31, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2014/07/31/massachusetts-even-more-liberalthan-you-thought/HCk5j2MZ7b64zmi3SZiKzH/story.html [https://perma.cc/SY9T-TC3X] (noting that
Massachusetts stereotypes include “Taxachusetts,” “[t]he bluest state,” and “[a] vegetarian convention,”
and are all “well-earned” given poll results in the state).

242

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70.2

federal immigration law without a warrant; and (c) no current federal law gives
Maine’s LEAs the authority to conduct such arrests. Lastly, this Note will
conclude by advocating for opponents of current immigration policy to launch a
challenge against ICE detainers in state courts by couching their arguments in
terms of how the practice violate state law prohibitions against warrantless arrests
for civil offenses and by discussing the possible barricades that proponents of ICE
detainers may erect to protect them from attack.
II. THE REVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF LUNN V. COMMONWEALTH
The facts in the Lunn case are relatively simple. Sreynuon Lunn, a
noncitizen without legal status and subject to a final order of removal, was
originally arrested for a single count of unarmed robbery in October 2016.28
Before his arraignment in Boston Municipal Court, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) issued a detainer to Boston’s police department and any subsequent
LEAs that might hold him to keep him in their custody for an additional two days
beyond when he would otherwise be released so ICE could arrest him. 29 After
failing to post bail, the Suffolk County Sheriff's Office held Lunn while he awaited
trial.30 When a judge dismissed the case against him for lack of prosecution,
Lunn’s attorney requested that he be released, but the judge declined. 31 Lunn
remained in court custody in a holding cell until several hours later, at which point
ICE took him into federal custody.32 Lunn’s attorney promptly filed a petition to
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, alleging that the trial court officers had
violated Lunn’s federal constitutional rights by detaining him. 33
The court in Lunn classified the detention of a person in response to an
ICE detainer as a warrantless arrest34 for a civil violation of federal immigration
28

Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d. 1143, 1147 (Mass. 2017).
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 1148.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.at 1153. Federal law authorizes ICE officers to issue detainers without a warrant, and even if
a warrant is issued, there is no review by a neutral and detached magistrate to determine if sufficient
probable cause exists. Memorandum from Acting ICE Director Thomas D. Homan, Issuance of
Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers(Mar. 24, 2017) (noting that issuing a warrant with
a detainer “is not legally required”); Kagan, supra note 13, at 157 (“Immigration arrest warrants [that
may accompany detainers] do not include review and authorization by a judicial officer, nor by any
other neutral adjudicator such as an immigration judge. In immigration enforcement, the ‘warrant’
issues with the officer's signature alone.”). Instead an ICE officer fills out form I-247A
“IMMIGRATION DETAINER – NOTICE OF ACTION,” which states that “DHS HAS
DETERMINED THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS THAT THE SUBJECT IS A REMOVABLE
ALIEN” and lists four possible justifications: (1) the existence of a “final order of removal against the
alien”; (2) “[t]he pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the alien”; (3) “[b]iometric
confirmation of the alien’s identity and a records check of federal databases”; or (4) the presence of
“other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate[s] [that] the alien either lacks immigration status
or . . . is removable under U.S. immigration law.” U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Form I-247A,
Notice of Action (Mar. 2017). The problem is that removability is not sufficient to justify a noncitizen’s
arrest by local LEAs. Santos v. Frederick City Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 464-65 (4th Cir. 2013)
(“Lower federal courts have universally and we think correctly interpreted Arizona v. United States as
precluding local law enforcement officers from arresting individuals solely based on known or
suspected civil immigration violations.”). In an attempt to address this deficiency, DHS recently
changed its detainer policy so that future detainer requests will be accompanied by I-200 “Warrant for
Arrest of Alien” or I-205 “Warrant of Removal/Deportation” forms. Memorandum from Acting ICE
29
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law.35 Failing to find a legal justification for a warrantless arrest for a civil
violation of federal immigration law either explicitly36 or implicitly37 in federal
law38 or specifically in state law,39 the Lunn court held that because no state or
federal statute authorized LEAs in Massachusetts to arrest suspected noncitizens
for civil violations of federal immigration law, holding noncitizens beyond the time
for which there is a preexisting legal justification is unlawful in the state. 40
The reason why this seemingly state-specific holding is so revolutionary
for the national debate about ICE detainers is in the way the justices analyzed their
Director Thomas D. Homan, Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers(Mar. 24,
2017). This new form does not cure the constitutional defect as this “warrant” can also be issued by an
ICE officer without a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate. Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F.
Supp. 3d 1237, 1252 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[T]he probable cause determination here was made by an ICE
officer, not a neutral magistrate.”); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas City, No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014
WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (“But the ICE detainer alone did not demonstrate probable
cause to hold [the noncitizen] . . . . It stated only that an investigation ‘has been initiated’ to determine
whether she was subject to removal from the United States.”).
As a result, courts have consistently classified arrests stemming from an ICE detainer as
warrantless, which the federal government has conceded in previous litigation. Cervantez v. Whitfield,
776 F.2d 556, 559-60 (1985) (recording a stipulation by the federal government that “an immigration
hold is an arrest without [a] warrant.”); Moreno v. Napolitano,213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (stating that the federal defendants in the case “concede[d] that being detained pursuant to an . . .
immigration detainer constitutes a warrantless arrest."); see generally Kagan, supra note 13, at 161 (“In
immigration, ‘warrants’ are signed only by the law enforcement agency, so that in criminal law terms
immigration enforcement makes warrantless arrests the norm.”). These warrantless arrests are assumed
to be unreasonable under federal law. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“The Fourth
Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that
‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967))).
35
Lunn, 78 N.E.3d at 1155. Although entry into the country is a misdemeanor criminal offense,
INA § 275(a), presence without legal status is a civil violation that may render the noncitizen
deportable. INA § 237(a)(1)(B); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396, 407 (2012) (“Removal [of
noncitizens] is a civil, not criminal, matter” because “[a]s a general rule, it is not a crime for a
removable alien to remain in the United States.”); Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 2015)
(“th[is] Court has ‘consistently classified’ removal ‘as a civil rather than a criminal procedure’” (quoting
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952))); Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237,
1247 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“A warrant issued under this discretionary authority [by ICE] is necessarily a
warrant for civil—as opposed to criminal—immigration enforcement.”).
36
Lunn, 78 N.E.3d. at 1159 (“In those limited instances where [INA § 287(g)] affirmatively grants
authority to State and local officers to arrest, it does so in . . . explicit terms . . . .”).
37
The court dismissed the notion that states possess “inherent authority” to “cooperate” with
federal officials in implementing federal immigration law in light of Arizona v. United States. Id. at
1157 (“Where neither our common law nor any of our statutes recognizes the power to arrest for Federal
civil immigration offenses, we should be wary about reading our law’s silence as a basis for
affirmatively recognizing a new power to arrest . . . under the amorphous rubric of ‘implicit’ or
‘inherent’ authority”). The court also rejected the idea that “287(g) agreements”—which allow police to
serve as immigration officers but only after receiving specialized training and when supervised by the
Attorney General—provided a mechanism through which the federal government can grant the authority
necessary to arrest noncitizens for civil violations of immigration laws, particularly when there is no
controlling state law on the books. Id. at 1159.
38
Lunn, 78 N.E.3d. at 1159.
39
Id. at 1155 (“Conspicuously absent from [Massachusetts] common law is any authority (in
absence of a statute) for police officers to arrest generally for civil matters, let alone authority to arrest
specifically for federal civil immigration matters.”); see generally Santos v. Frederick City Bd. of
Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A]bsent express direction or authorization by federal
statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an
individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.”).
40
Lunn, 78 N.E.3d. at 1146.
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illegality not just in terms of federal constitutional law—by aggregating and
clarifying the logic behind several recent federal court decisions—but also by
viewing the issue through the lens of state common and statutory law. The court’s
approach demonstrates the vulnerability of ICE detainers to an important new angle
of attack. Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not discuss the
broader implications of its holding, the outcome in Lunn is provocative and
inspiring for practitioners in any state that shares a common state law foundation
with Massachusetts and that is either unlikely to resolve this dispute through the
legislative process (like Maine) or ruled by a conservative majority who may try to
compel LEAs to honor ICE detainers without considering the state law implications
(like Texas).
III. THE MAINE CASE STUDY: APPLYING LUNN WITHIN ANOTHER STATE’S
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK
The degree to which Lunn can be exported to another state—such as
Maine—will ultimately hinge on three key legal issues: (1) whether maintaining
custody of a noncitizen after the expiration of any preexisting state law justification
qualifies as an “arrest” under state law; (2) whether any state statute or common
law precedent provides the legal authorization that is necessary for LEAs to
conduct warrantless arrests for civil violations of federal immigration law; and (3)
whether any current federal law might provide the necessary legal justification. As
this Note will demonstrate in this section, the fact that the detention of a noncitizen
in accordance with an ICE detainer qualifies as an arrest under Maine law41 and
neither Maine state common or statutory law, or federal law adequately authorize
LEAs to conduct such warrantless arrests for civil violations of federal immigration
law.42 This means not only that ICE detainers appear to violate Maine state law but
also that Lunn can be used as a weapon against ICE detainers in a state with a
slightly different statutory system and common law precedent.
A. Holding a Noncitizen in Custody in Accordance with an ICE Detainer is an
“Arrest” under Maine State Law
The use of the word “detainer” by ICE officers to describe their requests
for local police departments to hold suspected noncitizens is deceptive because
“detention” and “arrest” are related yet distinct concepts under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution.43 Although a “detainer” conceptually involves
“detention,” it resembles an “arrest” in practice because a “detention” involves a
momentary or limited seizure of a person based on reasonable suspicion while an
arrest involves a longer period of custody justified by probable cause. 44 Any new
41

See discussion infra Section III.A.
See discussion infra Sections III.B-C.
43
See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[W]hile a detainer is distinct
from an arrest, it nevertheless results in the detention of an individual.”); Gonzalez v. City of Peoria,
722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled on other grounds by Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina, 199
F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting that “‘Detention’ defines a special category of fourth
amendment seizures that are substantially less intrusive than arrests . . . [but when] the defendant is
transported to the police station and placed in a cell or interrogation room he has been arrested, even if
the purpose of the seizure is investigatory rather than accusatory”).
44
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits government agents from detaining a person in the absence of
probable cause,” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S.Ct. 911, 918 (2017), and “requires a judicial
42
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arrest, such as by holding someone in accordance with an ICE detainer, requires a
new probable cause finding separate from the justification for the initial arrest. 45
Courts in Maine define a lawful arrest as including four components:
(1) an intention on the part of an arresting officer then and
there to make the arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2)
a communication of that intention by the arresting officer to
the one whose arrest is sought; (3) an understanding of that
intention by the person who is to be arrested; and (4) the
actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be
arrested by one having the present power to control that
person.46
This definition for arrest in Maine closely resembles the definition of “arrest” in
Massachusetts.47 These definitions both incorporate (1) the officer’s intent; (2) the
objective understanding of the person being arrested; and (3) the actual or
constructive detention or seizure of a person. They differ only slightly: Maine law
includes an additional element by requiring that the arresting officer communicate
his intention to arrest the arrestee while Massachusetts law does not.
Given the clear parallels between these definitions for an “arrest,” it is
likely that a court in Maine would classify the detention of a noncitizen by police in
accordance with an ICE detainer as an arrest under state law. Although the police
departments “detain” noncitizens for ICE, the nature of this detention resembles an
arrest under the common law because the police department is seizing a person for
a period beyond a simple investigatory stop. 48 Additionally, the same common law
language that led the court in Lunn to classify holding a noncitizen in compliance
with an ICE detainer as an arrest exists in Maine’s common law, suggesting that a
court in Maine would come to a similar conclusion. The slight difference between
the two definitions only involves communication between the arresting officer and
the person being arrested. This does not fundamentally change the essential
elements of an arrest because the outcome and the relevant mental states of the
people involved remains unchanged even if this element was excluded from the
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). State v. Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, ¶ 11, 995, 995 A.2d 238
(“[A] detention may amount to an arrest and is lawful only if it is supported by probable cause.”)
(quoting State v. Langlois, 2005 ME 3, 863 A.2d 913, 916).
45
Morales, 793 F.3d at 217 (“Because [the noncitizen] was kept in custody for a new purpose after
she was entitled to release, she was subjected to a new seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes—one
that must be supported by a new probable cause justification.”); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County,
No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9 (D. Or. April 11, 2014) (“The seizures that allegedly
violated [petitioner’s] Fourth Amendment rights were not a continuation of her initial arrest, but new
seizures independent of the initial finding of probable cause for violating state law.”).
46
State v. Dorweiler, 2016 ME 73, ¶ 7, 143 A.3d 114 (quoting State v. Donahue, 420 A.2d 936,
937 (Me. 1980)).
47
See Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d. 1143, 1153 (Mass. 2017) (defining an “arrest” as
occurring when “there is (1) an actual or constructive detention or seizure, (2) performed with the
intention to effect an arrest, and (3) so understood by the person detained . . . [for which] [t]he
subjective understanding of the officer or defendant does not control”).
48
See Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, ¶ 11, 995, 995 A.2d 238 (distinguishing between a brief
investigatory stop and a “de facto arrest”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that LEAs to
conduct brief investigatory stops without probable cause while reiterating the need for LEAs to establish
probable cause before executing an arrest).
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definition. Critically, the federal government has conceded that holding a person
for the purpose of abiding by an ICE detainer qualifies as a “warrantless arrest,” 49
thereby weakening any argument they might make to the contrary. Therefore, it is
fair to assume that when police departments hold a noncitizen in compliance with
an ICE detainer, they have “arrested” that person under Maine state law.
B. Maine Statutes and Common Law do not Grant Local Law Enforcement
Officials the Power to Conduct Warrantless Arrests for Civil Violations of
Immigration Law
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 50 and Article I,
§ 5 of the Maine Constitution protect individuals from unlawful arrest in Maine. 51
Maine’s Constitution specifically states that “the people shall be secure in their
persons . . . from all unreasonable . . . seizures . . . and no warrant to . . . seize any
person . . . shall be issue[d] without a specific designation . . . [of] the person . . . to
be seized, nor without probable cause.” 52 These protections arise only if the
encounter between the police and the individual constitutes a seizure of the citizen
to the point that the individual “is not free to walk away.” 53 If the police do in fact
conduct an arrest without adequate justification, they may be held liable under state
law.54
The probable cause that is necessary for an arrest with or without a
warrant exists “whenever facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the
police and of which there was reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a
prudent and cautious person to believe that the arrestee had committed [a] crime.” 55
Although the standard for probable cause has “a very low threshold,” 56 the
justification for arrest still must be objectively reasonable. 57 This probable cause
49
Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F.Supp.3d 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2016); see also Cervantez v.
Whitfield, 776 F.2d 556, 559-60 (5th Cir. 1985).
50
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51
Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 476 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled on other grounds by
Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[A]rrests for federal offenses
can be justified by state law authorization only if the arrest procedures do not violate the federal
Constitution.”); State v. Blier, 2017 ME 103, ¶ 8, 162 A.3d 829; Clifford v. Maine-General Med. Ctr.,
2014 ME 60, ¶ 67 n. 21, 91 A.3d 567.
52
ME. CONST. art. I, § 5.
53
State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 10, 759 A.2d 1085 (“[W]hen the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen . . . we conclude that a
‘seizure’ has occurred.”).
54
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 704 (2015) (holding liable LEAs that execute an arrest warrant
“wantonly or oppressively, or detain[] a person without a warrant longer than is necessary to procure
it . . . .”).
55
State v. Johnson, 2014 ME 83, ¶ 11, 95 A.3d 621 (quoting State v. Foy, 662 A.2d 238, 240 (Me.
1995); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense
has been or is being committed.”). A probable cause determination needs to be “particularized with
respect to the person to be searched or seized.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). This
standard applies for arrests with or without a warrant. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479
(1963) (“Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which an
officer may act are more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent
then where an arrest warrant is obtained.”).
56
State v. Lagasee, 2016 ME 158, ¶ 14, 149 A.3d 1153 (quoting State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115, ¶
7, 754 A.2d 976).
57
State v. Flint, 2011 ME 20, ¶ 12, 12 A.3d 54 (“[I]t is the objective view of the circumstances
that matters; the arresting officer’s subjective belief regarding whether probable cause exists is not
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determination requires a fact-specific analysis by a neutral magistrate,58 and
includes the collective information known to the police.59 Importantly, in Maine,
the police’s ability to execute a valid arrest of anyone, including a noncitizen, when
they possess probable cause but neither a warrant nor reason to believe a crime has
been committed, is restricted to a specific list of offenses defined by statute.60
Similarly, LEAs can arrest someone for a civil offense only in limited
circumstances: Maine statute permits arrest or detention for noncriminal matters
such as contempt of court,61 involuntary commitment of the mentally ill,62 material
witness orders,63 failure to provide child support,64 and refusal to comply with
As compared to Massachusetts’ statutes, Maine’s
monetary judgments.65
noncriminal detention laws are more limited in scope. 66 Massachusetts and Maine
statutes and common law are similar, though, in that neither state provides to police
the authority—using the language in Lunn—“to arrest generally for civil matters,
let alone authority to arrest specifically for Federal civil immigration matters.” 67
Ultimately, then, the permissibility of arresting a noncitizen in Maine for unlawful
presence by holding them in compliance with an ICE detainer beyond any period of
time authorized by a preexisting charge or conviction will depend on (1) whether a
neutral magistrate has issued an arrest warrant after conducting a fact-specific
analysis of probable cause and (2) if such an arrest falls within one of the
categories under which police officers can execute an arrest for a civil offense.
When a noncitizen violates federal law by being unlawfully present, the
noncitizen has committed a civil, non-criminal offense. Therefore, the re-arrest of
such a noncitizen solely for unlawful presence (as opposed to for the initial
criminal offense that led to his detention) must be predicated on one of the
justifications for arresting a person in Maine for a civil offense, which are clearly
delineated in state statutes. Just as in Massachusetts, Maine does not grant the
police the power to arrest people for all civil violations, and none of the civil
violations that justify an arrest in the relevant statutes—such as contempt of court
or the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill—cover the arrest of a noncitizen
for unlawful presence, either directly or tangentially. Importantly, the specificity
with which the Maine legislature has authorized noncriminal detention suggests a
determinative.”). See generally Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 834 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Probable cause may
be a loose concept, but it leaves no room for the absurd.”).
58
State v. Martin, 2015 ME 91, ¶ 15, 120 A.3d 113; State v. Hawkins, 261 A.2d 255, 259 (1970)
(“The policy of the law is that the existence or absence of probable cause shall be determined by a
‘neutral and detached magistrate’ and not by ‘the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 (1948))).
59
Lagasse, 2016 ME 158, ¶ 14, 149 A.3d 1153.
60
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 15(1) (2015).; See Lagasee, 2016 ME 158, ¶ 13, 149 A.3d
1153 (“law enforcement officers are authorized to make warrantless arrests under certain circumstances,
including when an officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed any Class A, Class
B, or Class C crime.”).
61
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3136(2) (2015).
62
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B §§ 3862(1), 3864 (2017).
63
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1104 (2017).
64
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 2361(8) (2017).
65
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3135 (2017).
66
See Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1156 (Mass. 2017) (listing Massachusetts statutes
that authorize detention of individuals in the following circumstances: “protective custody for
intoxicated persons”; “emergency hospitalizations for mental illness”; “involuntary commitment of
persons with alcohol and substance abuse orders”; “sexually dangerous persons”; “civil contempt for
noncompliance with spousal or child support order”; and “material witnesses in criminal proceedings”).
67
Id. at 1155.
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conscious exclusion of other justifications or circumstances. Therefore, it appears
that arresting a noncitizen for unlawful presence in compliance with an ICE
detainer is impermissible under Maine law because LEAs lack adequate probable
cause to do so. This type of arrest for a civil violation is simply not authorized by
statute.
C. Neither Federal Statutes nor Section 287(g) Agreements Appear to Empower
Maine Law Enforcement Officials to Conduct Arrests for Civil Violations of
Immigration Law
The Supreme Court recently rejected the idea that states possess any
“inherent authority” as sovereign entities to enforce immigration laws.68 Instead,
the authority to arrest is a matter of state law, unless it is defined in federal
statute.69 Federal law sets clear limits on the ability of state or local police officers
to enforce federal immigration law. 70 Federal law does not grant LEAs the
authority to arrest an individual based solely on the possibility that the noncitizen is
removable because this justification fails to provide the requisite probable cause for
arrest.71 State and local police can only arrest noncitizens who are “illegally
present in the United States” and have “previously been conflicted of a felony . . .
and deported or left after such conviction” but only after obtaining “appropriate
confirmation from [ICE] of the status of such individual[,] for such a period of time
as may be required . . . to take the individual into Federal custody[,]” and “to the
extent permitted by relevant State and local law.”72
The power possessed by LEAs to enforce federal immigration law may be
expanded through “cooperative” INA § 287(g) agreements73— a program through

68
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396, 410 (2012) (“By . . . authorizing state and local
officers to engage in these enforcement activities as a general matter, [a state law permitting warrantless
arrests for certain civil immigration violations] creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”); see also IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 425 (15th ed. 2016) (“The
notion of 'inherent authority' to arrest and detain undocumented persons . . . has been seriously
undermined in Arizona.”).
69
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948) (“In [the] absence of an applicable federal
statute the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its validity.”).
70
See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408 (“Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state
officers may perform the functions of an immigration officer.”).
71
See id. at 407 (“If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability,
the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.”).
72
8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a) (2012).
73
Former DHS Secretary John Kelly revived the “Secure Communities” program and expanded
the use of 287(g) agreements to enforce federal immigration law soon after the Trump administration
came to power. Memorandum from DHS Secretary John Kelly, Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to
Serve
the
National
Interest
(Feb.
20,
2017),
available
at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-ImmigrationLaws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2FC-P5BT]. There has already been a
significant uptick in LEAs entering into 287(g) agreements since Trump took office with twenty nine
departments joining this year and “scores” of other LEAs contacting the Justice Department to express
their interest. Mica Rosenberg & Reade Levinson, Police in Trump-Supporting Towns Aid Immigration
Officials in Crackdown, Reuters (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-effectimmigration-police/police-in-trump-supporting-towns-aid-immigration-officials-in-crackdownidUSKBN1DR169 [https://perma.cc/YKG6-PUY9]. There are currently no Maine police departments
abiding by a 287(g) agreement. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Delegation of Immigration
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g
[https://perma.cc/8N4E-MR7U].
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which DHS deputizes police officers as “immigration officers.”74 These agreements
are entered into voluntarily. 75 Any additional authority granted by the agreement
applies only to incidences during which local police and federal officers are
working cooperatively while under the supervision of the Attorney General.76 Even
if federal law, state law, or a 287(g) agreement permits local police to enforce
federal immigration laws, this authority only extends to criminal matters. 77 Any
power granted to state officials to arrest noncitizens pursuant to federal law is also
circumscribed by procedural limits on arrests contained within the federal
Constitution.78
Federal statutes do not seem to grant state or local law enforcement the
power to arrest individuals for civil violations of federal immigration law without a
warrant. Therefore, it is likely that a court in Maine would find that police
departments lack the necessary legal authority to hold noncitizens in accordance
with ICE detainers absent a clear state law justification for such an arrest. Federal
law specifically limits the situations in which local police can execute federal
immigration law, and case law suggests that even if the local police have this
authority—whether it be through a 287(g) agreement or a federal statute—it may
be limited to criminal matters for which they already possess the authority to arrest
individuals under state law. Therefore, it appears that police forces in Maine lack
the requisite authority to enforce civil federal immigration law that might justify
the holding of a suspected noncitizen in response to an ICE detainer request.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Lunn opens up a new front in the resistance against the use
of ICE detainers to enforce federal immigration policy across the country in states
with similar common law and statutory frameworks to Massachusetts. With the
constitutional footing of the practice significantly weakened by recent federal
cases,79 state courts are positioned to be major players in the inevitable future
debates about the appropriate means by which to police immigration and the degree
74
See INA §§ 287(g)(1), (3) (“[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a
State, or any political subdivision of a State, . . . who is determined by the Attorney General to be
qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to its investigation, apprehension, or
detention of aliens . . . subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.”); Kelly, supra
note 73 (“The INA § 287(g) Program has been a highly successful force multiplier that allows a
qualified state or local law enforcement officer . . . to perform all law enforcement functions specified in
section 287(a) of the INA, including the authority to . . . arrest [noncitizens] . . . under the direction and
supervision of the [DHS].”).
75
INA § 287(g)(9) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any State or political
subdivision of a State to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection.”).
76
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 410 (2012) (“There may be some ambiguity as to
what constitutes cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the term would
incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any
request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government.”).
77
See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f the [local police] are to
enforce immigration-related laws, they must enforce only immigration-related laws that are criminal in
nature, which they are permitted to do even without section 287(g) authority.”); Gonzalez v. City of
Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 476 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina,
199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“We . . . conclude that state law authorizes [local] police to
enforce the criminal provisions of the [INA] . . . [and] [w]e firmly emphasize . . . that this authorization
is limited to criminal violations.”).
78
Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 477.
79
See supra text accompanying note 24.
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to which LEAs will be part of these policies. State courts, such as those in Maine,
are likely to be called upon soon to enter into the fray and look at the intersection
of state statute, common law, and federal immigration law as it pertains to ICE
detainers. Their decisions may serve as a bulwark against any changes to federal
policy or law that are likely to result as the Trump administration squares off
against “sanctuary cities” and other actors resistant to his crackdown on illegal
immigration.
Fundamentally, Lunn changes the dynamics of the struggle because it
provides an avenue for practitioners to go on the offensive—particularly in states
resistant to any challenges to ICE detainers or unlikely to resolve the issue
legislatively. If an ICE detainer qualifies as an arrest under state law and there is no
state statutory grant of power to conduct warrantless arrests for civil violations of
immigration law, then it is likely that a state court will rule that detainers are
unlawful.80 The federal precedents are clear: unlawful presence is a civil offense,
ICE detainers are warrantless because there is no oversight when they are issued by
a neutral magistrate, and LEAs cannot unilaterally enforce civil federal
immigration law, even if they enter into a 287(g) agreement with the Justice
Department.81 Unless federal courts take a radical turn and override these
precedents, practitioners should feel empowered to rely on current federal law to
support a strike against the ICE detainer system.
Even with this current advantage, practitioners in conservative states need
to be mindful of how their state’s government may respond to fill the breach and
eliminate the vulnerability of ICE detainers from attack on state law grounds.
Immediately after the Lunn decision came down, Charlie Baker, the Republican
governor of Massachusetts, proposed that the legislature pass a law specifically
providing for LEAs to conduct arrests for civil violations of federal immigration
law.82 Although it never passed, Baker did correctly identify the reliance of the
Lunn court on the “statutory gap” under current Massachusetts law that—if filled—
80
Conducting a fifty state analysis is beyond the scope of this Note, but it is still worth
highlighting the fact that ICE detainers may be vulnerable to attack on state law grounds even in
conservative jurisdictions like Texas. Texas defines an arrest slightly differently than Maine and
Massachusetts by asking its courts to analyze five variables: “(1) the amount of force displayed; (2) the
duration of a detention; (3) the efficiency of the investigative process and whether it is conducted at the
original location . . . ; (4) the officer’s expressed intent . . . ; and (5) any other relevant factors.”
Melendez v. State, 467 S.W.3d. 586, 592-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Although these variables may be
weighed differently by different courts, the ultimate test is “whether a reasonable person would perceive
the detention to be a restraint on his movement comparable to a formal arrest . . . .” Id. at 592 (quoting
State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App.2012). Texas statute defines a “warrant of arrest,”
inter alia, as “a written order from a magistrate,” meaning that ICE detainers are not “warrant[s] of
arrest” under state law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.01 (West 2015). To conduct a warrantless
arrest, Texas LEAs must possess either probable cause or specific statutory authority to do so. Dansby v.
State, 530 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. App. 2017). Just as in Maine and Massachusetts, Texas statutes fail
to provide such authority in regards to arrests for civil violations of federal immigration law. See art.
14.01-.04. Therefore, it is possible that ICE detainers may violate Texas state common law—even
though the state has recently passed legislation to force LEAs to honor them. See Barragan, supra note
11 (describing the state’s efforts to proscribe compliance with ICE detainers).
81
See supra text accompanying note 74. Although these agreements may provide additional
authority for LEAs to enforce criminal immigration law, courts have unanimously declined to extend
this power to civil enforcement. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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might provide sufficient legal justification for honoring ICE detainers in the state. 83
It is worth noting, though, that even if such steps might address the state
law problem with ICE detainers or decrease LEA’s liability, they would not cure
the underlying constitutional weaknesses exposed by several federal courts 84 and
acknowledged by numerous LEAs across the country. 85 The awareness by LEAs of
these issues has already had a chilling effect in some states because they fear the
increased exposure to liability that accompanies being complicit in honoring
detainers.86 But the resistance has not been universal, as evidenced by Texas’s
attempt to compel LEAs to honor ICE detainers87 and the threat by Maine
Governor LePage to fire sheriffs who do not comply. 88 Although the constitutional
challenge remains, it is certainly possible—even likely—that states with unified
governments that support the use of ICE detainers will be able to quickly
counterattack by fixing whatever state statutory “gaps” make the practice unlawful.
This eventuality means that the power of Lunn will be limited primarily to states
with divided governments, like Maine, that are unlikely to resolve the issue
legislatively.
Another novel response by LEAs interested in protecting the ICE detainer
system, not from attack on state law grounds, but from federal constitutional
challenges is for the LEA to coordinate with ICE directly so that ICE, not the LEA,
take custody of the noncitizen immediately. 89 This custodial sleight of hand
involves the LEA leasing a prison cell to ICE so that as soon as the term of the
original detention on state law grounds expires, the noncitizen is placed in an
“ICE” cell.90 Although this may appear at first blush to fix the constitutional defect
with ICE detainers, it actually demonstrates how proponents fundamentally
misunderstand the problem. 91 Even if ICE immediately takes custody, the Fourth
Amendment requires that any LEA—including ICE—get a warrant from a
detached and neutral magistrate92, meaning that the warrantless arrest93 that takes
83

Id.
ACLU, supra note 24 (listing federal court decisions).
85
Dickerson, supra note 4.
86
Id.
87
Barragan, supra note 11.
88
Murray, supra note 25. It is ultimately quite ironic that Maine sheriffs may, in fact, be following
state law by not honoring ICE detainers—even if they and Governor LePage are currently unaware.
89
Dickerson, supra note 10.
90
Id.
91
See Kagan, supra note 13, at 128-29, 132 (“The principal constitutional problem with
immigration enforcement is that a person may be deprived of liberty without any prompt review by a
neutral magistrate to determine if probable cause exists to justify the arrest and continued custody . . .
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the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
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place when a noncitizen is held in ICE’s cell is still likely unconstitutional.
Although there is likely to be a substantial response by either the Trump
administration or state governments that are in favor of the current crackdown on
illegal immigration to any attack, Lunn provided an opening salvo in a conflict that
may well topple the ICE detainer system as it currently exists. Lunn exclaims a
worthy battle cry for practitioners in states in which the legality of ICE detainers
remains unsettled, and it is time for them to hear its message loud and clear.

